Incompatibility of Subjective and Objective Knowledge :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Incompatibility of Subjective and Objective Knowledge In his book The View From Nowhere (1986), Thomas Nagel discusses the various jobs that arise when we consider the seam between the objective world we inhabit, and are part of, and the inherently subjective way we view that world. Nagel writes that understanding the relationship between these external and internal standpoints is primaeval to solving these problems It is the most fundamental issue about morality, knowledge, freedom, the self, and the relation of mind to the physical world (p.3). In this essay I will survey the problems that Nagel is referring to, and will retrieve Nagels view that this issue is of central importance within philosophy. However, I will also suggest that Nagel is wrong in his emphasis in dealing with the issue. The opening move words of the book make it clear that Nagel sees ultimately all a single problem how to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective vi ew of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included. He then goes on to address the particular problems, each of which he sees as only an aspect of this single overall problem. Problem 1 How can we account for the existence of subjective experience within an objective physical universe? This problem is a modern version of the mind/body problem i.e. what is the relationship between the mind and the body? Are they separate entities, or are they in some manner different aspects of the same thing? The question was posed in Nagels 1974 essay What Is It Like to Be a Bat? and has been somewhat revitalised recently in the guise of Chalmerss hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). Nagel argues that although we may understand the way bats use sonar to perceive their world, to fly and catch insects, we will never know what it is analogous to be a bat using sonar, precisely because we are not bats. Our understanding of bat sonar can only be a physiologic and functional accoun t we will only ever have a view of bat sonar from the outside. Imagine what sonar must feel comparable inside, to a bat In the same way that there is something it is like for us to see the world using our eyes (i.e. colours, hue and depth in our visual field), surely there must also be something it is like for bats perceiving the world through sonar.